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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a compliant encryption method for JPEG
2000 codestreams such that the encryption process does not
introduce superfluous JPEG2000 markers in the protected
codestream, i.e., the protected codestream preserves the syn-
tax of the original codestream. The proposed encryption
method works with any standard ciphers, incurs no stor-
age overhead, introduces negligible computational cost and
maintains all the desirable properties of the original JPEG
2000 codestream such as error resilience and scalability.
1. INTRODUCTION
JPEG2000 [1] is the latest international still image compres-
sion standard. JPEG2000 Security (or JPSEC in short) is
Part 8 of the JPEG2000 standard. One major technical issue
in JPSEC is encryption (e.g., for codestream access control
and confidentiality protection). A JPEG2000 codestream is
composed of markers and data packets. The markers, with
values restricted to the interval [0xFF90, 0xFFFF], are used
to delimit various logical units of the codestream, facilitates
random access, and maintains synchronization in the event
of error-prone transmission. The packets carry the content
bitstreams whose codewords (i.e., two contiguous bytes) are
not in the interval [0xFF90, 0xFFFF]. Since the output of a
good cipher appears ”random”, straightforward application
of a cipher to encrypt codestream packets is bound to pro-
duce encrypted packets which include superfluous markers.
Such markers will cause potentially serious decoding prob-
lems (such as loss of codestream synchronization and erro-
neous or faulty image transcoding). To overcome the su-
perfluous marker problem, the encryption method must be
JPEG2000 codestream syntax compliant. Such a compli-
ant encryption method does not introduce superfluous mark-
ers in the encrypted packets and maintains all the desirable
properties of the original codestreams.
Zeng et al. [2][3] selectively shuffle MPEG streams us-
ing shuffling tables so as to maintain syntax compliance.
This shuffling method was generalized to index mapping in
[4]. However, the schemes in [2]-[4] are not applicable to
JPEG2000 codestream because the shuffling tables are too
large to be implemented in practice.
A syntax-aware encryption scheme was proposed by Wu
and Mao [4]. This scheme applies bit stuffing in conjunc-
tion with selective bitstream encryption to overcome the su-
perfluous marker problem. However, bit stuffing not only
incurs some storage overhead, but also leads to additional
work for updating packet headers.
Conan et al. [5] described a technique which selectively
encrypt JPEG2000 codestreams in order to generate compli-
ant encrypted codestreams. In this scheme, if any byte, say
X , has a value less than 0xF0, the four LSBs (Least Signif-
icant Bits) of X are encrypted with a block cipher. Clearly,
the security of this simple scheme is weak.
Wu et al. [6] introduced a word-level encryption scheme
employing a stream cipher without scarifying the strength
of security. It encrypts packets in a codestream using arith-
metic addition-module operation, rather than the standard
XOR-module operation. However, the scheme produces
only partial compliant protected codestreams.
Canon inc. proposed another word-level scheme [7]
which encrypts a word recursively until the ciphertext is
compliant. This scheme not only has to check the value
of the current encrypted word, but also its proceeding byte
and succeeding byte. Ma et al [8] pointed out that Canon’s
proposal was not reversible, i.e., portion of a plaintext can
not be recovered from the corresponding ciphertext.
Wu and Ma [9] proposed two packet-level encryption
schemes based on stream ciphers and block ciphers, respec-
tively. They showed that the two schemes protect 99% of
a codestream. However, the schemes are not able to regain
synchronization when a byte is changed into 0xFF or when
part of the packet is lost.
This paper presents a codeblock-level compliant scheme
which independently encrypts Codeblock Contribution to
Packets (CCPs) using standard ciphers. Our scheme pro-
vides full protection of codestreams and allows direct ma-
nipulation of the codestreams at the granularity of code-
blocks. In addition, the protected codestreams inherit all the
desirable properties of the original JPEG2000 codestreams,
e.g., error resilience and scalability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 briefs the structure of JPEG2000 packets. Section 3 de-
scribes our proposed compliant encryption scheme. Section
4 analyzes the performance of the proposed scheme. Simu-
lation results in Section 5 demonstrate the efficiency of the
proposed scheme. A conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
2. JPEG2000 PACKET STRUCTURE
In JPEG2000 standard [1], a tile-component of an origi-
nal image or its lower resolution is decomposed into LL,
HL, LH and HH subbands, where LL is the lower resolu-
tion used for further decomposing. Each subband includes
many codeblocks. The individual bit-planes of the quan-
tized DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform) coefficients in a
codeblock are coded in one of the three coding passes: sig-
nificance propagation, magnitude refinement, and cleanup.
The basic content unit in a JPEG2000 codestream is
packet which is associated with a specific tile, layer, com-
ponent, resolution and precinct. Each layer consists of a
number of consecutive bit-plane coding passes from each
codeblock, including all subbands of all tile-components.
Referring to Figure 1, a Codeblock Contribution to Packet
(CCP) is explicitly signalled within the packet header, and
CCPs in a packet body is arranged in the order of HL, LH
and HH subbands. Additionally, an important restriction
imposed by the JPEG2000 standard is that the last byte of a
CCP can never be 0xFF [10].
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Fig. 1. Packet Structure: Packet bodies include CCPs
(Codeblock Contribution to Packet).
3. THE COMPLIANT ENCRYPTION SCHEME
The goal of a compliant encryption is to output a protected
codestream whose length is the same as that of the input
codestream, and any word in the output content bitstream is
not in the interval [0xFF90, 0xFFFF]. Our proposed scheme
selects CCP as the processing unit because the end byte of
CCP is non-0xFF. Assume that the encryption engine shares
a secret key with the decryption engine in advance. The
following subsections elaborate how to adapt stream ciphers
to generate compliant ciphertexts.
3.1. Compliant Encryption
Figure 2 illustrates the process of encrypting a CCP P into
a compliant bitstream C. Assume that the CCP has a unique
identifier which is determined by tile, component, subband,
etc, and P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} is of n bytes. The encryp-
tion process proceeds as follows:
(1) Generate key stream K of n bytes from the secret key
and CCP identifier with a stream cipher key generator.
(2) Input P into the Microblock encryptor.
(3) Compute C = P+K mod 256n = {C1, C2, · · · , Cn},
where Ci is the ith byte, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(4) Check whether C is syntax compliant. Specifically,
for any i ∈ [1, n−1], if CiCi+1 ∈ [0xFF90,0xFFFF],
C is non-compliant. In this case, let P ← C, and go
back to step (2).
(5) Check the last byte Cn. If Cn = 0xFF, C is non-
compliant, let P ← C, and go back to step (2).
(6) Output C as the compliant bitstream.
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Fig. 2. Diagram of Compliant Encryption.
3.2. Compliant Decryption
The decryptor parses a protected codestream into CCPs as
the encryptor does. For each CCP, the compliant decryption
is illustrated in Figure 3.
(1) Generate the key K of n bytes from the shared key and
CCP identifier using a stream cipher key generator.
(2) Input bitstream C into the Microblock decryptor.
(3) Compute bitstream P = C−K mod 256n = {P1, P2,
· · · , Pn}, where Pi is the ith byte, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(4) Check whether P is syntax compliant. Specifically,
for any i ∈ [1, n−1], if PiPi+1 ∈ [0xFF90, 0xFFFF],
(i = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1), P is non-compliant, let C← P,
and go to step (2).
(5) Check the last byte Pn. If Pn = 0xFF, P is non-
compliant, let C ← P, and go to step (2).
(6) Output P as the plaintext bitstream.
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Fig. 3. Diagram of Compliant Decryption.
4. PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Rationale
In the present scheme, CCP is encrypted recursively until
the ciphertext meets two requirements:
• any word (two contiguous bytes) is within [0, 0xFF90)
• the end byte is not 0xFF.
That is to say, a protected bitstream looks like a CCP. Ob-
viously, this kind of protected bitstream is uniquely deter-
mined with the minimal number of encryptions. Thus, the
encryption process is reversible. On the other hand, any
CCP can be encrypted into a compliant bitstream.
4.2. Scalability
Because the CCP is the processing unit, the packets in a pro-
tected codestream can be re-organized with any progressive
orders. The protected codestream can also be processed at
the granularity of codeblocks without going through any en-
coding again. Therefore, the present scheme maintains the
scalability of the original JPEG2000 codestream.
4.3. Error Resilience
In a JPEG2000 codestream, an error in one coding pass will
propagate to the rest of the coding pass bitstream. In the
present scheme, because the processing is CCP oriented, an
error is limited to the damaged CCP only. Thus, the present
scheme maintains the error-resilience of JPEG2000.
4.4. Computational Cost
Because encryption is regarded as a randomization opera-
tion, the probability p of generating a compliant bitstream
with one macroblcok encryption is
p > pn0 = (
255
256
)n,
where p0 is the probability that one byte is not 0xFF. The
solid line in Figure 4 illustrates the probability of generat-
ing a compliant bitstream. Let q = 1 − p. Because the
rounds of encryption are independent, the expect number of
encryption for a compliant bistream is
En = p+ 2qp+ 3q2p+ · · · =
+∞∑
r=0
(r + 1)qrp =
1
p
The dashed line in Fig. 4 shows the upper boundary of En.
The JPEG2000 standard defines the size of a code-block
as no more than 4096 bits per bitplane. Thus the maximum
size of a CCP is 4096α bits where α is the number of bit-
planes. In fact, the size of a CCP is usually small due to the
underlying efficient compression algorithm and layer seg-
mentation. Because encryption operation is merely arith-
metic module addition, and the key stream is generated only
once, the computational cost is very small.
4.5. Variant
Although stream ciphers are exemplified in the above mi-
croblock encryption/decryption, block ciphers are applica-
ble too. Technically, assume the size of employed block
cipher is b, and the size of bitstream P is n, then ECB mode
(chapter 9 of [11]) of the block cipher is selected for en-
crypting the first b × bn/bc bytes, and the aforementioned
stream cipher is selected for encrypting the rest of the bit-
stream P.
5. SIMULATIONS
The sizes of CCPs vary from codeblocks, packets, and im-
ages. In this simulation, 5000 compliant bitstreams are used
as test examples. The key stream is generated using RC4
(Chapter 17 of [11]) . The number of repeated encryption
(arithmetic addition module) is shown in Table 1. In Table
1, the first column is the size of CCP in bytes, the other
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Fig. 4. Solid line: Success probability (lower boundary) of
Macroblock encryption vs. bitstream size. Dash line: the
number (upper boundary) of expected Macroblock encryp-
tion vs. bitstream size.
columns represent the percentage of repetitions for gener-
ating protected compliant bitstreams. Table 1 indicates that
the small number of repetitions is of high probability.
Table 1. Percentage of encryption for generating a compli-
ant bitstream.
CCP size 1 2 3 4 >4
8 96.5 0.1 3.4 0.0 0.0
58 69.6 22.1 7.5 0.8 0.1
108 65.3 23.0 9.9 1.5 0.3
158 61.2 25.6 10.8 1.9 0.5
208 55.9 29.0 10.9 3.2 1.0
258 52.1 30.6 11.7 3.9 1.7
308 49.3 31.7 12.7 4.5 1.9
358 48.0 29.1 9.8 8.3 4.8
408 44.8 29.3 10.6 6.6 8.6
458 43.0 28.2 11.8 7.4 9.6
6. CONCLUSION
JPSEC focuses on the security aspect of JPEG2000 code-
streams and files. Encryption is one of its main concerns.
However, straightforward encryption may generate super-
fluous markers in the protected codestreams. The compli-
ant encryption method proposed in this paper overcomes the
problem using the standard ciphers and keeps the structure
of the codestream. The proposed method also provides full
protection of the codestream, maintains all the nice proper-
ties of the original JPEG2000 codestream, such as error re-
silience and scalability. We believe that the basic principle
presented here can be applied to encrypt other data formats,
such as MPEG.
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